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ARGUMENT
In the brief of respondent the State has quoted verbatim
the provisions contained in Utah Code Ann. §76-5-203 (Supp. 1975)
and the definition of intentionally and knowingly contained in
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-103 (Supp. 1975) and conclude that there was
clearly sufficient evidence to warrant a conviction of second degree
murder.
It is important to the appellant that the facts in the
instant case be applied very carefully to the meaning of the various
words and phrases contained in the Utah Second Degree Murder Statute.
It is important to note that the actions of the appellant
in the instant case were under circumstances that diminished his
judgment because of his considerable drinking and provocation on
the part of the deceased.

Because of the provocation and heated

passion it is contended that the appellant did not possess the necessary
mental state to come within the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-203
(Supp. 1975).

Paragraph A of the Second Degree Murder Statute requires

the appellant to act intentionally or knowingly. If in fact the appellant's
actions cause the death of the deceased, it could not in good conscience

be argued that he acted with intent to kill.

The appellant's

subsequent actions after the incident by calling for the assistance
of an ambulance and remaining at the scene until the victim was
removed and taken to the hospital clearly reveal that he had no
malice

or intent to kill.

To act knowingly, Utah

Code Ann. §76-2-103

(supp. 1975) Paragraph 2 requires a person to be aware that his
conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.

The result in the

instant case would be the death of the victim Mr. Greed.

It is

argued that the appellant was not aware that his conduct was reasonably
certain to cause the death of Mr. Greed.

Even though

the facts in

the instant case go beyond the normal exchange of blows in a fight
between two individuals, it certainly does not reach the porportions
to where the one gaining a physical advantage over another would
reasonably expect the punishment delivered to cause the death of the one
receiving the punishment.

It is also important to note that Mr. Greed

was in poor physical condition because of years of alcoholism which
caused the condition of decalcification of his bones which would account
for the ease of fracturing his ribs and puncturing the vital organs
which eventually lead to the death of Mr. Greed.
To come within the meaning of Paragraph B of the Second
Degree Murder Statute, the appellant must intend to cause serious
bodily injury while commiting an act clearly dangerous to human life.
Utah Code Ann. §76-1-601 (9) (Supp. 1975) says that serious bodily
injury means injury that creates or causes serious permanent disfigurement
protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member
—

—^—
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„moi-oci * substantial risk of death.

In the instant case

it would be necessary to show that the appellant had the intent to
cause those conditions outlined in the definition of serious bodily
injury, that is a specific intent to cause permanent disfigurement,
protracted loss or impairment of the function of the body member or
create a substantial risk of death.

It would be difficult to argue

that while the appellant was engaged in combat that he was thinking
about causing permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment
of the body function or create a substantial risk of death.
Paragraph C of the Second Degree Murder Statute would require the
appellant to act under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference
to human life while committing a reckless act which creates
a grave risk of death.

The definition of depraved indifference is

completely lacking in the Utah Code but the dictionary definition
suggests that the wickedness

perversion and corruption would apply.

Evidence of this nature is completely lacking in the instant case
since it appears that the appellantTs reaction was more in line with
heat of passion or extreme mental or emotional disturbance.

Depravity

would also be rebutted by the fact that the appellant attempted to
protect the victim after the incident by calling for an ambulance
and telling on-lookers to keep away from Mr. Greed.
It is readily apparent upon a reading of the transcript
that if the appellant is guilty of anything, his guilt would be more
in line with negligent homicide or perhaps manslaughter.

The

negligent homicide statute, Utah Code Ann. §76-5-206 (Supp. 1975)
would require the appellant to do an act with criminal negligence.
The definition of criminal negligence is explained in Utah Code Ann.
§76-2-103(4) the definition basically requires that the appellant ought to
be awflrp rhat-
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that the circumstances exist or the result will occur and the risk
must be of such a nature and degree that failure to perceive it
constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an
ordinary person would exercise in all the circumstances as viewed
from the appellant's standpoint.

It seems clear that the conduct

of the appellant is more in line with the standards set out in
negligent homicide rather than the more aggravated circumstances
in the second degree murder statute.
Even though it is believed that negligent homicide is
more applicable in the instant case, it should be pointed out that
manslaughter is closer to what occured than second degree murder.
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-205 (Supp. 1975) provides for reckless conduct,
conduct

while

under the influence of extreme mental or emotional

disturbance and conduct where the appellant reasonably believes the
circumstances provide a moral or a legal justification or extenuation.
The reckless conduct under the manslaughter statute is the same as
under the second degree murder statute except the second degree murder
statute has the additional aggravating circumstances involving a
depraved mind and creating a grave risk of death.

The recklessness

under the manslaughter statute would clearly be mor applicable to an
argument situation and subsequent combat such as we have here than the
recklessness in the second degree murder statute involving a depraved
mind and knowledge that he is creating a grave risk of death.
A reading of the transcript leaves considerable room for
argument that some other force other than that of the appellant was
present in this incident.

There was competent medical testimony that

in the opinion of the Doctor the victim had been hit by an automobile.

This would be supported by the fact that the position of Mr. Greed's
body when removed by the ambulance was a considerable distance
from where
Greed.

the altercation occurred between the appellant and Mr.

According to the testimony of Lynette Carr the altercation

occurred in back of an automobile that was parked adjacent to the
lounge.

Mrs. Carr testified that she saw the appellant standing

behind the automobile bracing his hand on the back fender on the
driverfs side with his body moving in an up and down motion.

The

lounge was on the driver's side of the automobile with some distance
between the automobile and the building.

When Detective Lee Smith

viewed the body Mr. Greed's head was a couple of feet from the car.
The position that Mr. Smith described would place the body of Mr.
Greed near the building on the other side of the car from where
Lynette Carr testified the incident occurred.

This would clearly

indicate that some other force moved the body in the position
that it was found at the time the ambulance arrived.

Another fact

to note is that a tread mark type of bruise was found on the deceased
which was not consistent with the smooth surfaced shoe soles that the
appellant was wearing at the time of the incident.

This type of

injury would seem to be more consistent with contact from the tires
of a moving car or a third individual who may have been wearing
heavy soled shoes.

No unusual findings were discovered on the

appellant's boots such as skin that would indicate a severe stomping.
The blood that was found would not be inconsistent with a fight.
The most the experts could say about the blood in any event is that
it was human blood.
Item.Q
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It may have even been the appellants own blood.
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produced at trial and were apparently destroyed.

These items

may have been important evidence concerning the question of
whether or not the deceased could have been struck by an automobile.
Other items of evidence such as the bridge lodged in the deceased
throat which was apparently never removed was never explained.

There

was no evidence that the bridge belonged to the deceased.
CONCLUSION
It would seem clear that if in fact the appellant's
action caused the death of Mr. Greed that the circumstances
would not warrant a conviction of second degree murder but would be
more consistent with negligent homicide.
Respectfully submitted,

LYNN R. BROWN

I

i

RECEIVED
LAW LIBRARY
1^JUN1977
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY

J. Reuben Car!; Lew School

i

